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Control of animal waste has been 
a major policy challenge. We 
identify the properties of efficient 
regulation and suggest that effective 
policies to control animal waste will 
enhance utilization of manure in 
local production and may change 
land allocation among crops. We 
also show that policies that aim to 
control local environmental problems, 
ignoring spillover among regions, 
may be significantly suboptimal and 
need to be replaced by policies with 
a global perspective. 
The range and magnitude of impacts of animal waste are worldwide and vary among dif­
ferent regions. Animal waste is a key 
source of nitrates and salts impairing 
groundwater quality in California’s 
San Joaquin Valley. Hypoxia in the 
northern Gulf of Mexico is linked to 
nitrogen and phosphorus loadings from 
the immense Mississippi River Basin. 
There, agriculture is by far the most 
important source of both nutrients, 
and manure is the biggest source of 
phosphorus and an important source 
of nitrogen. In the Chesapeake Bay, 
manure surpluses from the basin’s 
animal husbandry accelerate eutrophi­
cation, which is harmful for commer­
cial fisheries and recreational activities. 
Over the past few decades, the 
number of animals per production 
facility has increased substantially and 
production has been concentrated geo­
graphically. As a result, local feed pro­
duction cannot satisfy the nutritional 
needs of these growing production 
units. Feed is largely purchased from 
markets outside the production region, 
while the manure by-products from 
animals remain in the region. This leads 
to an accumulation of nutrients which, 
in turn, increases nutrient loading to 
ground and surface water systems. 
The challenge is to achieve profitable 
animal production while contaminating 
the environment as little as possible. 
Any production tends to gen­
erate pollution as an unintended 
by-product. Without government 
intervention, no individual operator 
will factor the amount of pollution 
into decisions regarding the number 
of animals cared for on the land, 
manure-management technologies, 
crop choices, etc. Generally, it would 
be beneficial for society to pollute less 
than what is observed under a free 
market system. Yet, eliminating pollu­
tion altogether is too costly and regula­
tion is needed to keep it at desirable 
levels that maximize societal welfare. 
Regulation, on the other hand, 
is always defined for, and often dif­
fers among, given regions. In the 
United States, regulation of water 
quality is guided by the federal Clean 
Water Act (CWA). States emphasize 
designing, imposing, and enforc­
ing the actual regulations imposed 
at the federal level. When regulating 
concentrated animal feeding opera­
tions (CAFO), for instance, states 
may establish rules that influence 
manure-application practices. As our 
economic analysis will demonstrate, 
regional regulation has serious caveats. 
For this study, we create a stylized 
framework to illustrate regional regula­
tion and its potential failure. Hereby, we 
establish a need for applied economic 
analysis to further clarify the problem 
and help improve existing policies. We 
examine the effects of regional (state 
level) regulation on the generation 
of residual nitrogen and phosphorus 
from animal and crop production. 
We also show that stricter but unco­
ordinated environmental protection 
in one region may lead to increased 
environmental damage in the other. 
The two main reasons for this are:
1) Measures that reduce nutrient resid­
uals, particularly crop choice, exhibit 
trade-offs between phosphorus and 
nitrogen residuals; and, 2) The role of 
nitrogen and phosphorus in generating 
externalities differs between regions. 
Nitrogen and Phosphorus 
Manure nutrients are useful in enhanc­
ing crop productivity, and can be uti­
lized in production as fertilizers. The 
crucial difference between manure and 
chemical fertilizers is that a farmer is 
only able to choose the overall level 
of manure application, which deter­
mines the applied amounts of both 
nutrients. With chemical fertilizers,
any combination of nitrogen and phos­
phorus are commercially available. 
Nutrient requirements of crops 
vary significantly. Corn needs about 
140 pounds of nitrogen and between 
20 and 30 pounds of phosphorus 
per acre (at medium soil phosphorus 
values). Soybeans, on the other hand, 
can utilize atmospheric nitrogen and 
recommended phosphorus rates vary 
between 20 and 45 pounds per acre. 
Also, the concentration of phos­
phorus and nitrogen in animal manure 
differ. Dairy manure contains about 
1.5 times more nitrogen than phos­
phorus, while dry hog manure con­
tains roughly equal amounts of both. 
To avoid the costs of applying both 
chemical fertilizers and manure, 
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Decision Variable Economic Outcomes Nutrient Residuals
Table 1.  Decomposing the Decision-Making Process
LIVESTOCK FARMER 
Number of Animals 
Revenues from animal products 
Cost savings from utilizing manure; 
Production costs; Feed costs 
Amount of manure increasing with the number of  
animals; N-P concentration in manure fixed for each 
production animal 
Application of Manure 
on Own Land 
Savings in chemical fertilizers; 
Hauling and application costs 
Relatively scarce nutrient generates zero residual,  
positive residual for the other 
Export of Manure to 
Crop Production Area 
Revenues from selling manure; 
Hauling and application costs 
Relatively scarce nutrient generates zero residual,  
positive residual for the other 
Deposit Area for 
Excessive Manure 
Free disposal on own land; 
Hauling costs if on crop farm 
All applied manure excessive of crops needs adds to  
residual nutrients, regardless of location 
Crop Choice 
Savings in feed costs/revenues from selling; 
Crop specific N-P uptake 
Fertilization costs 
CROP FARMER 
Manure Import Substitute chemical fertilizers N-P of manure net of crop specific N-P uptake 
Crop Choice 
Revenues from selling; 
Fertilization costs 
Relatively scarce nutrient generates zero residual,  
positive residual for the other 
farmers choose the manure quanti­
ties on the basis of one nutrient, 
often nitrogen; while the other, often 
phosphorus, is applied excessively. 
Residual nutrients, often coming 
in the form of runoff, are harmful for 
ground and surface waters. Protect­
ing groundwater requires controlling 
nitrogen loading, and mitigating eutro­
phication requires reducing loading of 
either or both of the nutrients, depend­
ing on the watershed characteristics. 
Arid regions with little surface water, 
like California, tend to suffer from 
groundwater quality problems but face 
very little eutrophication. Agricultural 
regions draining into the Chesapeake 
Bay, on the other hand, may suffer 
from both problems. Regions located 
directly on the Bay may be more con­
cerned with phosphorus than nitrogen, 
depending on the (perceived) effects 
nutrients have on eutrophication. 
This discrepancy may cause one 
region to emphasize controlling nitro­
gen and another to control phosphorus. 
Problems can arise if regions share 
common surface waters, as one region 
may undertake measures that mitigate 
problems they experience but aggravate 
problems experienced by the other. 
Two Farm–Two Region Model 
We consider a stylized model of an 
upstream and a downstream region. 
The upstream agricultural region is 
comprised of a livestock farm and 
a crop farm. The downstream rec­
reational region has no agricultural 
production but derives benefits 
from surface water quality. Nutri­
ent residuals in the agricultural 
region are the only determinants of 
nutrient loading in both regions. 
We assume that the agricultural 
region suffers from elevated nitrate 
concentrations in its groundwater and 
nitrogen-driven eutrophication in its 
rivers. Hence, its regulation focuses on 
nitrogen. The downstream recreational 
region is concerned with regulating 
phosphorus to protect its coastal waters. 
The decision-making framework 
for total livestock and crop produc­
tion relies on basic economic and 
technical characteristics. While it does 
not capture the complexities of eco­
nomic decision-making or the nutrient 
loading governed by hydrology, it 
allows for sufficient details needed to 
obtain qualitative policy conclusions. 
The objective in our model is profit­
ability of the farms while accounting for 
the adverse effects of nutrient loading 
on the downstream region. We vary the 
way that profits and nutrient loading 
are weighed by assigning four alterna­
tive decision makers to conduct the 
optimization: the crop farmer, the live­
stock farmer, a regional policy maker, 
and a global (federal) policy maker. 
The farmers’ choices and the associ­
ated costs and benefits are presented 
in Table 1. The dark green color in 
Table 1 stands for revenues and the 
light green for costs associated with the 
choice variable given in the left column. 
Manure nutrients used as substitutes 
for chemical fertilizers create economic 
value. The costs are created by hauling 
and application. The environmental 
damage is linked to residual nutrients, 
i.e., the differences in nutrients applied 
and nutrient uptake. The literature 
recognizes that under expected profit 
maximization of the farms, there will 
typically be some residuals generated. 
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Policy Maker soybean 
We want to focus on characteristics 
of residuals when manure is the source 
of nutrients and policies differ region­
ally. Therefore, we assume chemical fer­
tilizers create some residual nutrients, 
but we normalize this to zero. Further­
more, we assume that manure is applied 
at least according to crops’ agronomic 
nitrogen needs but, due to the nutri­
ent phosphorus ratio of manure, phos­
phorus is always applied excessively. 
Given these guidelines, what do the 
choices of our decision makers look 
like? Table 2 considers three alternative 
situations representative of Midwestern 
farms. First, both livestock and field 
crop farmers interact, pursuing profit­
ability without awareness of nutrient 
loading to ground and surface waters. 
This prompts policy makers to inter­
vene. The regional policy maker consid­
ers only surface and groundwater qual­
ity problems in the agricultural region, 
while the global policy maker addition­
ally considers the eutrophication of sur­
face waters in the recreational region. 
We assume a cow produces 12 gal­
lons of fresh manure daily, and 126 
pounds of plant-available nitrogen and 
115 pounds of phosphate phosphorus 
annually. The crop choice is between 
corn and double-cropped soybeans after 
small-grain silage. The agronomic needs 
for corn and soybeans are 140 and 85 
pounds of nitrogen and 25 and 52.5 
pounds of phosphorus per acre, respec­
tively (at optimal soil phosphorus value 
as per Maryland recommendations). 
The first row in Table 2 presents 
the choices of the farmers who do not 
3.94 800 0 
3.90 800 91 
3.90 800 450 
consider nutrient loading. Consider­
ing only profits, the livestock farmer 
ends up having 1000 animals (milk­
ing cows with an average weight of 
900 pounds), which generate about 
four million gallons of fresh manure 
annually. The most profitable crop 
choice is the double-cropped soybean. 
In this case, the farmer substitutes 
chemical fertilization with manure 
as long as the costs of hauling and 
application are below or at the costs 
of buying chemical fertilizers. Regard­
ing this, the farmer ends up apply­
ing manure on all her farmland, 
but does not import anything. 
The price received from the crop 
farm does not cover the costs of hauling 
and applying for farther distances. The 
excessive manure application is about 
two million pounds. The farmers’ over­
all solution generates residual nitrogen 
of 72.5 pounds per acre and residual 
phosphorus of 97.7 pounds per acre. 
Regional policy standards aim to 
eliminate nitrogen residues from the 
upstream region. At the livestock farm 
level, it leads to a switch to corn, a 
slight reduction in herd sizes, export of 
manure to the crop production farm, 
and reduced profits of the livestock 
farmer. Since corn consumes less phos­
phorous than soybeans, transition to 
corn increases the phosphorous resid­
ual. This happens despite the fact that 
the regional policy maker’s solution uti­
lizes the almost two million pounds of 
manure that were applied excessively. 
The global policy maker (for 
example, state instead of counties) 
1.81 72.5 97.7 
0.0 0.0 103.0 
0.58 14.8 40.0 
recognizes that rivers carry most of 
the dissolved phosphorus to the other 
region, and places more weight on 
phosphorus loading. She concurs with 
the regional policy maker’s slight cut 
on animal numbers but maintains the 
farmers’ initial choice of crops. She 
requires farmers to incur high costs 
from hauling manure to the crop 
production area, but allows some 
excessive application of manure. This 
creates about 15 pounds per acre of 
residual nitrogen and about 40 pounds 
of residual phosphorus per acre. 
As a summary, the regional policy 
maker’s intervention always improves 
surface and groundwater quality in the 
upstream region, but may simultane­
ously worsen surface water quality 
downstream. This follows from reduc­
tions in residual nitrogen but poten­
tial increases in residual phosphorus, 
which occur because the agricultural 
regional decision maker does not 
account for the phosphorous loading 
problem in downstream regions and 
simply focuses on the nitrogen load­
ing problem of the agricultural region. 
Discussion and Policy Implications 
In the United States, nutrient manage­
ment plans (NMP) are key to mitigat­
ing the impacts of excess nutrients 
from animal waste. Concentrated 
animal feeding operations (CAFO), 
i.e., large animal facilities, have to 
conduct and follow NMPs to bal­
ance the application and uptake of 
nutrients. NMPs follow either nitro­
gen or phosphorus standards and, in 
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most cases, only apply to farmland 
controlled by the livestock facility. 
In accordance with the Clean Water 
Act, each state has created a list of 
impaired waters and defined their criti­
cal pollutants. A phosphorus standard 
should be followed if local waters are 
designated phosphorus-critical and 
if there are significant risks for phos­
phorus loading. Otherwise, a nitrogen 
standard is often followed due to its 
lower compliance costs. If it is desig­
nated as critical for certain downstream 
waters to be free of phosphorous load­
ing, a regional approach may aggravate 
downstream pollution. In our example, 
the regional policy maker’s solution 
coincided with a nitrogen standard. 
Our framework could be used to 
assess manure regulation in California. 
Here, two relevant pollutants for NMPs 
and environmental concern would 
be nitrates and other salts. Choos­
ing techniques that allow nitrogen to 
evaporate in compliance with a nitro­
gen standard might aggravate prob­
lems of salt sequestration in soils and 
groundwater. If these techniques allow 
farmers to meet regulatory standards 
while applying more manure per acre, 
more salts per acre would be applied. 
This paper raises further ques­
tions for economic and empirical 
analysis. Since NMPs are controlling 
the manure applications only on live­
stock farms, will tighter nutrient-use 
limitations as a result of residual effects 
induce unwanted and even illegal 
manure-handling practices? Dairy 
management plans in the San Jacinto 
watershed report manure as being 
both imported and exported from the 
region. They also suggest that illegal 
dumping is taking place. The challenge 
is not only to introduce regulation 
but also to enforce it; and the more 
costly the regulation, the more incen­
tives there are for noncompliance. 
Furthermore, there are sugges­
tions that NMPs should be applied not 
only to livestock farms, but also to all 
Concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFO) have to conduct and follow nutrient management 
plans (NMPs), which are key to mitigating the impacts of excess nutrients from animal waste. 
farmland utilizing manure. This, too, 
might have unintended consequences. 
Crop farmers’ willingness to accept 
manure as a substitute for chemical 
fertilizers depends, for instance, on his/ 
her perceptions of its nutrient content. 
If these do not coincide with those set 
by NMPs, crop farmers’ willingness 
to substitute manure would decrease. 
This would force the livestock farm­
ers to either directly subsidize crop 
farmers’ manure applications or to find 
manure application areas farther away. 
Both practices would increase livestock 
farms’ compliance costs–and strengthen 
the desire for noncompliance. 
Finally, introducing policies based 
on a global perspective may be very 
beneficial to the United States or the 
state as a whole, but could have nega­
tive impacts in some of the affected 
regions. An example of this would be 
seen if the upstream region is forced 
to take uncompensated actions that 
improve the downstream region’s water 
quality. This distributional conflict may 
lead to the use of political processes to 
prevent enactment of certain policies. 
Lobbying by different regional 
groups could carry major implications 
for policy formation. Therefore, policy 
design may require incorporation of 
compensation mechanisms that will 
reduce the loss to upstream produc­
ers as they modify their actions to 
improve water quality downstream. 
The incorporation of political-eco­
nomic considerations is becoming 
an important part of environmental 
policy design, and will have major 
effects on total societal welfare as well 
as the welfare of individual groups. 
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